We all want to be free and our desire for freedom is what makes us human. The word freedom is obviously powerful and is often used in different contexts. When referring to morality, common expressions are used, such as "I am free to do whatever I want as long as I don't hurt anyone." In the political realm, freedom is used as what marks a civilized nation; repressive regimes are not associated with the word. Our intuitions tell us that freedom is our birthright, it is a good thing and, if necessary, we should fight for it. In our secular age, the word freedom is also used as a challenge to religion, particularly Islam. Religion is perceived as restricting freedom; it is "backward," "undemocratic," "medieval" and must be reformed.

However, what is the real meaning of the word freedom? Despite the common usage we give it, political slogans and personal sentiments, and taking into account the real-world consequences of the word, we must unravel the idea of freedom and analyze it philosophically. This will help us to respond to the charge that Islam restricts freedom. Before responding, it is important to note that this article will not attempt to unravel the misrepresentations that exist about Islamic law, refute misconceptions about God's commandments, or clarify misunderstandings in specific aspects of Islam, all of which are often mentioned to justify the view that Islam restricts freedom. This article will take an analytical approach to the idea of freedom and show how freedom can only come to be understood through a particular conceptual prism.

Freedom and coercion

Consistent and indisputable definitions of the word freedom focus on the absence of coercion. Therefore, in order to answer the charge that Islam restricts freedom, it is necessary that we have a good understanding of the concept of coercion. Empirical theories define coercion as follows: when a person has no reasonable alternative or choice but to act in accordance with what another person (or entity) has requested.¹ According to non-empirical theories² of coercion, a person may have no other reasonable choice, but would still remain uncoerced.³

non-empirical coercion

Former Harvard University professor Robert Nozick advocated a non-empirical explanation of coercion. Nozick was concerned with the notion of whether a person's actions would be voluntary in the context of being faced with "severely constrained choices."⁴ To understand whether a person's actions are being coerced requires an understanding of "what constrains his or her alternatives."⁵ For example, if the limiting factor is an act of nature, then that person's actions are not being coerced. Imagine a person who decides to go for a walk and along the way comes to a fork in the road. He wants to continue his walk to his left. However, someone calls him on his cell phone to inform him that in the direction he wants to go there is a tornado which, if he encounters it, may put his life in danger. Consequently, he has no choice but to turn back. Nozick advocated that a person will be being coerced into doing something if his action depends on other people "placing limits on the opportunities available to him."⁶ The actions of some people would be considered coercive if other people did not therefore have the right to act in a particular way.⁷

Nozick developed a rather clever argument which illustrates that if people act in accordance with their rights and their actions limit someone else's alternatives (or make their alternatives unreasonable or undesirable), their actions would not be considered coercive. He articulated his argument as follows:

There are 26 men and 26 women seeking spouses. Both groups are sorted. One group has been ordered from A to Z, and the other from A' to Z'. The order is based on their marital attractiveness. A and A' decide to marry. However, B also considered A' as the person she would most like to marry. Since A' is now married, B marries B'. A's action has obviously limited his alternatives, but since there is another person he would still consider marrying, his actions are not being coerced, or in Nozick's terminology, "have not been involuntary."⁸ Finally, this concludes with Z and Z' marrying. Z and Z' have no alternative but to marry each other, but their marriage is still voluntary; no coercion has taken place,

"The fact that their only other alternative was (in their opinion) much worse, and the fact that others chose to exercise their rights in a certain way, thus defining the external environment of options in which Z and Z' choose, does not mean that they did not marry voluntarily."⁹

Nozick argues that since the other people have made their decisions based on their right to choose whom they wish to marry and no one's rights were violated, Z and Z' have not been coerced,

"from A to Y, each acted voluntarily and according to his rights ... A person's choice between different degrees of unpleasant alternatives does not make him non-voluntary by the very fact that others chose voluntarily and acted within their rights in a way that did not provide him with a more pleasant alternative."¹⁰

Empirical explanation of coercion

Political philosopher Serena Olsaretti disagreed with Nozick. She advocated an empirical conception of coercion. She posited that when a person has no other reasonable choice, his or her freedom is restricted. Olsaretti objected to Nozick's argument by arguing that Nozick misrepresented the question about Z and Z''s choices. He said that Z and Z' were not forced to choose to marry and argued that this is not the issue to be addressed. Rather, the issue we are concerned with is whether Z married Z' being free from coercion,

"The question is not whether married voluntarily. Rather, the question is whether they married. with that particular couplethat is, if they voluntarily chose to marry that particular couple".¹¹

Olsaretti altered Nozick's thought experiment to include that not marrying would lead them to irrational and negative alternatives such as "strong social ostracism associated with not being married."¹² We could make the scenario worse by imagining that not marrying would lead to death. Olsaretti argued that in such a scenario the option to abstain would not be possible, so Nozick's view that there is no coercion as long as everyone has acted in accordance with their rights is indefensible.¹³

The empirical explanation is incoherent.

The political philosopher Alan Wertheimer argued against the empirical explanation of coercion by asserting that the outcome of a choice proposition is based on context. The concern that the possible alternatives to a particular proposal are unreasonable is irrelevant. What matters is whether or not the proposal infringes on one's rights. For example, imagine that a patient must undergo an operation on which his or her life depends. The medical staff proposes that the patient undergo surgery in order to ensure his or her survival. In order for the surgery to be performed, the patient must sign a consent form. In this context, the patient has no choice but to sign the form. The consequences of not doing so would lead to an untenable situation; death. According to the empirical explanation, the patient is being forced to sign the consent form and undergo surgery because the alternative is undesirable. However, when we look at this scenario under a rights-based approach, the problem is ultimately resolved. Although the patient has no reasonable choice but to sign the consent form, he or she does so without coercion. If the surgeon were to operate without prior consent, that would indeed amount to physical assault or abuse. From this example, and many others like it, we see that it is not so simple to say that someone has been coerced if the alternatives to a proposal are unreasonable. Coercion is about violating one's rights.

Freedom is about rights

In light of the above discussion, the most significant aspect of the concept of coercion is our conception of rights. Consider two different conceptions of rights: one negative and the other positive. Negative rights "do not impose on others an obligation to provide you with something."¹⁴ and are restricted to "life, liberty and property".¹⁵ Positive rights imply that people must be "provided with certain things".¹⁶ This implies that people have obligations on others. These obligations not only involve not interfering with the rights of others, but also ensure that "one receives all to which one is entitled".¹⁷ An example of positive rights includes the right to basic assistance to ensure the essential needs of food, shelter and clothing.

Those who advocate negative rights, such as libertarians, argue that there should be no positive rights at all. They argue that positive rights restrict freedom because of compulsion or imposition on individuals, so as to facilitate the rights of others. Their reasoning is based on the view that freedom is the absence of coercion. However, the notion of coercion for libertarianism is based on the rights that people have,

1. Freedom is the absence of coercion
2. The absence of coercion exists when rights are not violated.
3. Therefore, freedom exists when rights are not violated.

The libertarian conception of freedom is the absence of coercion, and coercion occurs when rights have been violated. This definition presupposes the negative view, which means that the premises of the libertarian argument require as much explanation as the conclusion, thus committing the fallacy of the circulus in probando (circular reasoning).

4. The negative opinion is the correct opinion about rights.
5. Therefore, preserving a person's negative rights protects his or her freedom.

In light of premises 2 and 3, 4 and 5 present a circular argument because they presuppose the negative view. Someone would have to agree with the negative view of rights for the argument to work. This highlights that what is required is a justification for premise 4; the negative view of rights.

Conversely, if someone adopts a positive view of rights, and given that freedom exists when rights are not being violated, the positive view could never be seen as a restriction of freedom. Therefore, those who advocate a positive conception of rights, such as socialists, also face the same problem. Since coercion is the violation of one's rights, they cannot claim that the libertarian view of rights restricts freedom, without first justifying their view.

4 '. The positive view is the correct view of rights.

5 '. Therefore, preserving someone's positive rights protects their freedom.

Again, in light of premises 2 and 3, 4 'and 5' form the circular argument. The argument presupposes the positive view. Since premise 1 holds that freedom is the absence of coercion, and 2 postulates that coercion occurs when rights are violated, 4 'and 5' form a circular argument because the positive view must be justified before it can be claimed to protect someone's freedom. In short, negative and positive views of rights (by extension, any conception of rights) require justification before they can be said to protect anyone's freedom.

The simplest conclusion so far is that freedom is not necessarily about choice, but about rights.

 

Does Islam restrict freedom?

The discussion so far leads us to the following key questions: Who has the correct conception of rights? Those who advocate negative rights, such as libertarians, or those who call for positive rights, such as socialists? Or is it the religious conception of rights?

"Indeed, we have honored the children of Adam."¹⁸

Since coercion implies the violation of rights, the view of freedom changes according to different conceptions of rights. So, if the Islamic tradition grants rights to individuals and groups, the accusation that it restricts freedom is misplaced and the discussion that should be had is, which conceptions of rights are correct. Inevitably, the discussion will then move away from inappropriate accusations to explore the basis of the Islamic conception of rights. If the basis of the Islamic conception of rights is coherent and true, therefore, Islam's view of rights is true, and it means that Islam preserves people's freedom.

According to the Islamic intellectual tradition, the existence of God is a self-evident truth, which can also be affirmed by rational inquiry, and it is God Himself who grants us rights. These rights are right because they come from the One who is maximally perfect. God has the totality of knowledge and wisdom; God has the complete image, we have only a pixel, He is the source of all goodness and is perfectly just.

"He is the source of all goodness."¹⁹

To properly unravel this point requires a separate discussion. Nevertheless, the argument presented in this article has shown that one cannot claim that Islam restricts freedom without presupposing a particular conception of rights. To assume its truth without more leads us to commit the fallacy of circular reasoning. Whoever claims to have the truth must be able to demonstrate why his conception of rights is the correct one.

 

Author: Hamza Andreas Tzortzis

Translator: Sh. Mohammad Idrissi

Article taken from Sapience Institute

 

References

¹ Alan Wertheimer. Coercion(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 192.

² The term non-empirical has been used to denote conceptions of coercion different from empirical explanations of coercion.

³ Alan Wertheimer. Coercion, 192.

⁴ Robert Nozick. Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 262.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid, 263.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid, 263-264.

¹¹ Serena Olsaretti. Freedom, Desert and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 130.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid, 131.

¹⁴ Andrew Bradley. "Positive Rights, Negative Rights and Medical Care". Journal of Medical Ethics 36, no. 12 (2010): 838.

¹⁵ Bans Parkan. "On multinational corporations and the provision of positive rights." Journal of Business Ethics 85 (2009): 76.

¹⁶ 16 Andrew Melnyk. "Is There a Formal Argument Against Positive Rights?" Philosophical Studies: An International Journal of Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 55, no. 2 (1989): 205.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ The KoranChapter 17, Verse 70.

¹⁹ The KoranChapter 52, Verse 28.